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Abstract 
The paper reports the results of series of experiments aimed at examining people’s 
readiness to use proportional voting as opposed to traditional, egalitarian ”one 
person-one vote“ principle. With proportional voting we understand voting 
procedures where the number of votes per person are determined based on how 
much the outcome of the vote influences each voter. In one experiment, the 
participants where asked to vote on a number of issues using various voting 
procedures. In addition to the traditional ”one issue—one vote“ procedure, the 
participants were also offered two voting schemes that let them freely divide a pre-
assigned total number of votes between issues in various ways. The participants 
were also asked to evaluate the issues to measure their stakes. In another 
experiment, the participants were asked to evaluate various voting procedures that 
pre-assigned votes to different voter groups depending on the stakes of these 
groups. The voting issues were hypothetical scenarios regarding municipal-level 
decisions about construction work. Participants evaluated proportional voting 
procedures more favorably when more information was available about the stakes 
of those involved in the voting process. The overall results show that, at least in 
experimental conditions, people are ready to use proportional voting and are 
equally satisfied with proportional and egalitarian voting procedures. However, the 
question remains open whether proportional voting schemes can realistically be 
introduced into real-life democratic process. 
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Introduction 
Several authors have pointed out the necessity for the modern democracy to 
consider the issue of voter stakes when deciding the issue on who has the voting 
rights (Harwood 1998, Heyd and Segal 2006, Zachariah 2006, Hortala-Vallve 2007, 
Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010) and argued for a proportional ideal and 
corresponding systems of plural voting. These authors have mostly offered their 
arguments from a normative point of view, that is, trying to define a voting system 
that would be the most appropriate form the point of view of democratic theory. 
However, this approach has also been criticized from a normative point of view 
(Fudge and Quinn 2001, Petrén 2006). In addition, previous empirical research has 
shown that normative models may fail to predict actual human behavior when it 
comes to voting, bargaining and coalition formation (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000, 
Diermeier and Morton 2003). 
At the same time, previous research has shown that stakes in various decision 
outcomes may systematically influence peoples’ behavior in bargaining games and 
social dilemmas (Sutter 2002, Konow 2005, De Cremer 2007, Croson and Konow 
2009). By extending these findings to voting contexts, one can predict that 
individuals’ satisfaction with various voting systems, and their willingness to use 
such systems, should depend on the level to which these voting systems allow 
voters to accommodate their stakes in various issues being voted on. However, to 
our knowledge there do not exist any published studies that have directly compared 
people’s reactions to voting schemes that explicitly take into account voter stakes, 
and the more familiar systems where each voter gets one vote.  
Proportional voting is well-known in the corporate world, where the number of 
shareholder votes depends directly on the stakes of each shareholder. Also, semi-
proportional voting systems exist in practically all democracies; e.g. in local 
elections non-local voters are often excluded from the vote. Cumulative voting 
schemes (where each voter can split a certain number of votes among several 
candidates or issues) have been implemented in specific political contexts 
(Brischetto and Engstrom 1997, Brockington et al. 1998), and have been shown to 
deliver economically optimal results in simulation studies and laboratory 
experiments (Casella 2005, Casella et al. 2006). However, most voting schemes 
employed in political contexts today are based on the one person-one vote 
principle, which we denote egalitarian voting in this paper. 
In the light of normative arguments in favor of the proportional ideal in voting, the 
first aim of this study was to investigate to what extent explicitly proportional 
voting was acceptable to people, and to explore what were the patterns of behavior 
when people were given an opportunity for proportional voting. With proportional 
voting we understand a voting system where people can cast more than one vote 
on an issue or candidate when they meet certain qualifications, or under certain 
conditions. In this paper, we study people’s reactions to two types of proportional 
voting. In the first experiment, we focus on cumulative (or storable) voting that 
allows voters to distribute a certain amount of votes among issues. In the second 
experiment, we examine the perception of plural voting, where people are assigned 
number of votes depending on their stakes in an issue. 
In addition, in the second experiment we also look at the type of stakes that may 
influence people’s perception of plural voting schemes. In particular, we compare 
people’s reactions to positive (expressed as potential gains) and negative 
(expressed as potential losses) stakes as bases for plural voting. It has been shown 
that presentation of dilemmas as gain scenarios vs. loss scenarios can significantly 
influence people’s responses to such scenarios—non-egalitarian principles (such as 
merit or need) are judged as more just when the dilemma is presented in a positive 
framing manner, such as allocation of good outcomes or withholding of bad 
outcomes (Gamliel and Peer 2006, 2010). In other words, people are less willing to 
accept non-egalitarian allocation principles when they involve a risk of loss to those 
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affected. These findings are in line with the general tendency towards loss aversion 
reported in the decision-making literature (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). To our 
knowledge, no studies have examined the effects of positive vs. negative stakes in 
voting contexts. Our second aim was to examine whether the principle of loss 
aversion would hold true for evaluation of egalitarian vs. proportional voting 
systems. If it did, it would have important implications for conditions, under which 
explicitly proportional voting systems are acceptable, and for the ways in which 
stakes should be defined for different voter groups. 
1. Experiment 1 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether people would use one type of 
proportional voting--cumulative voting--when given such a chance, and to compare 
their voting behavior with traditional, egalitarian voting schemes. Our hypothesis 
was that participants would use cumulative voting schemes when they had higher 
stakes in the issues being put on vote. The study consisted of an experiment where 
participants took part in a simulated referendum, and of a follow-up study where 
the same participants reacted to the results of that referendum. 
1.1. Method 
Participants for this study were 30 psychology students from Stockholm University 
who were asked to complete a questionnaire containing a simulated referendum of 
ten local political issues. The questionnaires were filled in by each student 
separately in facilities supplied by the Institution of Psychology at Stockholm 
University. The first page of the questionnaire asked for the participant’s gender 
and age as well as which of the seven political parties in the Swedish Parliament the 
participant favored. Each participant was asked to use three different voting 
procedures in the referendum, with the choice to vote for or against the issue, or 
not to cast their vote at all. The three different voting procedures included a system 
of voting based on the egalitarian ideal and two systems of cumulative voting based 
on the proportional ideal. With the egalitarian system of voting (E10) each 
participant was allowed one vote per issue, which is the traditional way of voting. 
With the two cumulative systems of voting, participants were allowed to distribute 
their votes among the issues. With the first of the two systems of cumulative voting 
(P10) participants were allowed one vote per issue, but they were also allowed to 
“save” votes by choosing not to cast a vote, and use these on other issues. With 
the second system of cumulative voting (P100) participants were given 100 votes 
to freely distribute among the ten issues. The order of systems of voting, which 
each participant were presented with, was randomized so as to avoid any order 
effects. The ten political issues are presented in the results section. 
After having used a system of voting, participants were asked to rate the system of 
voting in terms of justice and their satisfaction on a Likert type scale from one to 
ten, with one indicating “not at all just” and “not at all satisfied”, and ten indicating 
“very just” and “very satisfied”. On the last page of the questionnaire, participants 
were asked to rate the importance of each issue. The participants indicated the 
importance of each issue in relation to the other issues by giving the issue or issues 
with most importance a score of 100 and an issue or issues half as important as the 
most important a score of 50, and so on. 
In the follow-up study, the same participants who participated in the initial study 
were approached via email. Participants were presented with the results of each of 
the three  voting procedures. The results were displayed in three graphs without 
any information on which graph was a result of which voting procedure. Again, the 
order in which the graphs were presented was randomized so as to avoid any order 
effects. After each graph, participants were asked to rate how well the result 
reflected their own opinion on the ten issues. The rating was done with a similar 
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scale as the one used in the initial study, with one indicating “not at all” and ten 
“completely”. 
1.2. Results and Discussion 
The results of the referendum and different systems of voting are displayed in 
Figures 1 to 3 (see Appendix 1). As seen in these graphs, the differences in results 
by the different systems of voting are relatively small. No result of a single issue 
shifted between for and against as a consequence of system of voting. The results 
can be interpreted as that the systems of cumulative voting based on the 
proportional ideal (P10 and P100) are capable of expressing a similar public opinion 
as is expressed through the traditional egalitarian system of voting (E10) within a 
homogenous group of voters. However, further statistical analyses (Chi-Square 
test) showed that the few percent shifts in proportion of votes were statistically 
significant on several occasions (that is, unlikely to have occurred simply by 
chance). Outcomes in the P10 voting system for issues Nr 1, 3, and 4 were 
significantly different from those in the E10 system, and outcomes in P100 voting 
system for issues Nr 1, 2, 4, and 6 were different from those in the E10 system. In 
addition, outcomes for issues Nr 2, 5, and 6 differed significantly between the P10 
and P100 voting systems. This means that the shifts in voting outcomes were non-
trivial on several occasions. Although they did not change the outcome of the votes 
in our experiment, these significant changes suggest that the use of a proportional 
voting system can change the outcome of a vote where the proportion of those in 
favor and against an issue is more balanced than in our experiment. 
In addition, we also compared the average number of votes cast for and against 
each issue between the three voting systems. One-way dependent analysis of 
variance showed that the differences in results of questions 1 and 4 were significant 
(F (2, 48) = 9.035, p < .001; F(2, 48) = 9.896, p < .001). On both occasions, 
there was a significant increase in the number of “For” votes in both cumulative 
voting schemes (P10 and P100) in comparison with the egalitarian voting scheme 
(E10). The changes in the number of “Against” votes on these issues were not 
significant. Interestingly, the participants also evaluated these two issues as the 
most important ones (See Figure 4). It appears that at least for these two issues, 
the participants have indeed used the proportional voting systems to increase their 
influence because of their high stakes in these issues. 
When looking at Table 1, one can see that question 1 and question 4 attracted most 
voters across all three voting systems. One can also see from Table 1 that the 
participation in voting is ranging from 77% to 93% with the E10-system, in 
contrast to a more widespread participation ranging from 50% to 87% with the 
P10-system and 57% to 83% with the P100-system. This means that in the 
cumulative voting schemes the participants have indeed used the possibility to 
abstain from voting on separate issues to use their votes on the more relevant 
issues. As one might have predicted, questions 4 and 7 gathered the largest 
number of votes because they are obviously important to the student population. 
An explanation to why question one has received much interest might be that the 
traffic fees have meant reduced fees for public transportation, which is a common 
way of traveling among students. Also, the introduction of traffic fees has reduced 
car traffic in central Stockholm, which affects students’ living and traveling to 
central Stockholm in a positive way. 
Regarding how the participants perceived the different systems of voting, the mean 
rating for justice and satisfaction are displayed in Table 2. The difference of these 
ratings are relatively small, although the E10-received slightly higher ratings than 
the other two systems. Further analysis showed that these differences were not 
statistically significant. It is interesting to note, though, that there was a clear 
tendency that participants with leftist political orientation evaluated the proportional 
voting schemes as more just, (t(25) = 1.981, p = 0,059 (P10), t(25) = 1.957, p = 
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= 0.062 (P100), and indicated higher satisfaction, t(25) = 2.152, p = 0.041 (P10), 
t(25) = 2.786, p = 0.10 (P100), with the proportional voting schemes than 
participants with rightist political orientation did  There was no such difference for 
the egalitarian voting scheme. The mean differences for the proportional voting 
schemes were only marginally statistically significant (that is, from a mathematical 
point of view they could have occurred by chance), but they nevertheless indicate 
an interesting direction for further studies. 
We were also interested to see if the importance of the different issues could be 
better expressed with the systems of voting based on the proportional ideal than 
the system based on the egalitarian voting principle. Figures from such an analysis 
are presented in Table 3, which shows how well the rating of importance for each 
question is correlated with voting behavior (i.e. choosing to vote contra not 
choosing to vote, as well as the number of votes given either for or against an 
issue). The table shows that P10 and P100 overall generates greater correlations 
than E10, except for question five, which shows no significant correlation at all 
between importance and voting behavior for any of the systems. Taken together, 
P10 seems to be most effective in expressing the importance of an issue with 
voting behavior, with P100 more effective than E10. 
The purpose of the follow-up study was to examine which of the results better 
expressed the participants’ opinion as a group. The mean rating of how well the 
result of the voting with E10 reflected participants’ opinion was 6.46 (SD = 1.52, n 
= 28). Corresponding figures for P10 and P100 was 7.04 (SD = 1.29, n = 28) and 
6.89 (SD = 1.55, n = 28). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed that at 
least one of the differences between the three means was significant (F (1, 22) = 
3.32, p = .045). That means that although the participants seemed to like the 
traditional, egalitarian voting scheme better when asked directly about it, they were 
more satisfied with the outcomes of both proportional votes. However, although 
these data mean that both systems of cumulative voting seem to work better as a 
tool for expressing public opinion than the traditional way of voting, these findings 
should at this stage be interpreted carefully as the differences between the three 
results of the different systems of voting were relatively small and close to non-
significant. 
Looking at the results as a whole, the system of cumulative voting indeed shows 
promise and the findings of this study should be considered sufficient enough to 
continue to explore the positive and negative outcomes of this type of proportional 
voting, most importantly in other settings (e.g. in elections of candidates) and with 
more differing groups of participants (suitably two groups of participants with 
opinions heterogeneous between them and homogenous within them), and see if 
these findings continue to hold. 
2. Experiment 2 
The second study focused on a different type of proportional voting—plural voting. 
The aim of this study was to investigate how information about the stakes of 
different voter groups would influence the evaluation of voting schemes that assign 
different influence to these voter groups. The voting schemes were constructed 
combining two principles: the all affected principle that excluded voter groups with 
no stakes or low stakes in the decision, and a principle of proportionality that 
assigned votes to the groups based on their stakes. In addition, we wanted to test 
whether the type of stakes—that is, whether they are expressed as potential gains 
or potential losses—would influence the evaluation of the voting schemes. Our 
hypothesis was that proportional schemes (and possibly schemes that exclude low-
stake groups) should be more popular in loss scenario in comparison with neutral 
scenario, because respondents would think people who are facing a significant loss 
should be given more chance to avoid it. In the gain scenario, however, the 
egalitarian voting scheme should be more popular, because people who are gaining 
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significantly are already in a privileged situation and should not be given any 
additional privileges. 
2.1. Method 
Participants in this experiment were 102 psychology and education students from 
University of Latvia. Each participant completed a questionnaire about a fictitious 
scenario, in which city residents were given a chance to express their opinion about 
a new construction project in a local referendum. The situation was modeled after 
the current practice in Latvia, where a “public discussion” of each new project must 
take place, in which neighborhood residents can express their opinion for or against 
a particular project. Five different voting schemes were presented, where the 
number of votes assigned to each voter depended on how much the particular voter 
group would be affected by the construction (i.e., their stakes in the issue). The 
scenario and the five voting schemes can be seen in Appendix 2. 
In addition, we used the so-called between-groups design to present three different 
versions of the same questionnaire to the participants (each participant completed 
only one version of the questionnaire). In the gain condition, the stakes were 
expressed as gains (i.e., the properties of some of the voters would appreciate in 
value after the construction). In the loss condition, the stakes were expressed as 
losses (the properties would depreciate after the construction). In the control 
condition, there was no information about the change of property prices, and the 
stakes were expressed simply in terms of geographical proximity of the voter 
group’s residence to the construction cite. 
The participants were asked to rank the five voting schemes in terms of in light of 
their personal views of fairness, wisdom, and the greater good of society. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
Two questions were of interest when analyzing the results of this experiment. First, 
we wanted to know which voting schemes the participants evaluated as the most 
appropriate for the described situation. To answer this question, we compared the 
mean ranks of the five voting schemes (depicted in Figure 5). Statistical analysis 
(Friedman test) showed that voting scheme C (the most restrictive scheme) was 
the least popular, followed by voting schemes A (traditionally egalitarian) and B 
(moderately restrictive), which did not differ between them significantly. Scheme D 
(combination of exclusion and proportionality principle) and E (fully proportional 
scheme), which did not differ significantly between them, were the most popular 
ones. These results clearly show that participants preferred voting schemes that 
positively differentiated between groups with different stakes, assigning more 
voting power to groups with higher stakes. 
The second question was to what extent the evaluation of voting schemes 
depended upon the information about the stakes provided in the particular 
questionnaire version. To answer this question, we conducted one-way analyses of 
variance, comparing responses of respondents who completed the three different 
questionnaire types, separately for each voting scheme. We found significant 
differences for two voting schemes: scheme B, F(2, 101) = 4.04, p < .05 and 
scheme E, F(2, 101) = 10.2, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that in both 
cases the statistically significant differences appeared between the control condition 
on the one hand, and gain and loss conditions on the other. In other words, the 
evaluations of the voting schemes did not differ between the participant groups who 
received information about the potential gain or loss to apartment owners in the 
scenario, but both groups evaluated scheme B lower than the control group, and 
scheme E higher than the control group did. The results suggest that it did not 
matter whether the stakes of the apartment owners were positive or negative, but 
it mattered that financial information about the stakes was provided at all, to 
influence the evaluations. 
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General Discussion 
In general, the results of our studies show that people tend to use proportional 
voting systems when given such a chance (Experiment 1), and consider such a 
system appropriate under certain conditions when the stakes of the voter groups 
are clearly known (Experiment 2). The general tendency was that for more 
important issues (that is, for issues with higher personal stakes) participants used 
or preferred more votes in line with a cumulative voting system. In Experiment 1, 
the participants could determine their own stakes—that is, they were free to 
distribute votes among the issues. In real life, the situation would be more 
complex, because whoever organized the vote would have to decide which issues 
should be put together in one vote. The composition of the voting agenda would 
significantly affect the choices the voters would have to face. An important practical 
question would be, who would have the authority to compile the voting agenda? On 
the other hand, if this question could be solved, our results suggest that people 
might accept cumulative voting as a legitimate principle of making political 
decisions, and even be quite satisfied with the voting outcomes. 
It is interesting to note that leftist participants tended to be more favorable towards 
proportional voting schemes than the rightist participants. This result is in line with 
Brighouse and Fleurbaey’s (2010) prediction that egalitarians should embrace the 
proportional ideal as the most just system of voting. (This is assuming that leftist 
participants are also more egalitarian in their attitudes, as our previous research 
has shown (Dimdins and Montgomery 2005). However, the general political 
attitudes of participants in our experiments were not assessed, therefore this 
finding requires further research.) 
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that people prefer plural voting systems that 
do not exclude any voter groups over voting schemes that exclude groups with no 
stakes or low stakes in the issue being voted about. Perhaps this reflects the 
general fairness concern—people may be averse to potential limitations of other 
people’s rights. It appears that for the participants it was more important to give 
everyone a chance to participate in the decision making process, even if particular 
groups did not have explicit stakes in the issue being voted about. In contrast, 
people prefer to ensure that the stakes are reflected in the voting power by 
providing additional votes to the high-stake groups. This indicates that, under 
certain conditions, plural voting systems can be not only acceptable, but also 
preferable. 
It is interesting to note that the overall support for the proportional voting schemes 
was stronger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. One may speculate that this 
happened because in the plural voting schemes presented in Experiment 2 the 
voter stakes were clearly predefined. In contrast, the stakes in the cumulative 
schemes in Experiment 1 are not clearly defined. It is possible that the participants 
were concerned that with no clear stakes defined, the cumulative schemes can be 
in some way manipulated (so that the voting outcome does not reflect the true 
stakes of majority of voters). In other words, the participants used the cumulative 
schemes and were fairly satisfied with the voting outcomes, but they were not sure 
that other voters would use such schemes in a fair manner, which was reflected in 
the relatively lower evaluation of the cumulative schemes. 
Our results did not confirm the prediction that there would be a difference between 
the votes of participants to whom the scenario was presented with negative stakes 
(loss condition) and of those who evaluated the situation with positive stakes (gain 
condition). For those proportional voting schemes that received the most positive 
evaluation overall (Scheme D and Scheme E) the mean differences between loss 
and gain conditions were in the expected direction, but they failed to reach a 
statistical significance. One may speculate, though, that with a larger sample size, 
and with more personally relevant stakes involved, future studies might find the 
difference predicted from the theory. 
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In our Experiment 2, the mere fact that some information—either positive or 
negative—was provided about the stakes of different voter groups, increased the 
popularity of the plural voting schemes. A possible explanation of this finding may 
be found in the notion of response compatibility (Tversky et al. 1988). This notion 
implies that people tend to prefer a graded response (here graded votes) the more 
the input is graded (here in terms of information about the monetary value of the 
outcomes).  
The present result illustrates how important it is to clearly estimate and define the 
stakes of groups and individuals if plural voting schemes are to be used. This, of 
course, emphasizes the practical problem pointed out by Petrén (2006) and 
acknowledged by Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010)—that an important obstacle to 
proportional ideal is a lack of procedure for defining the stakes of all those involved 
in the voting process. For this normative ideal to work, everyone must perceive the 
definition of stakes as fair. 
References 
Brighouse, H. & Fleurbaey, M., 2010. Democracy and proportionality. The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 18, 137-155. 
Brischetto, R.R. & Engstrom, R.L., 1997. Cumulative voting and latino 
representation: Exit surveys in fifteen texas communities. Social Science 
Quarterly, 78, 973-991. 
Brockington, D., Donovan, T., Bowler, S. & Brischetto, R., 1998. Minority 
representation under cumulative and limited voting. Journal of Politics, 60, 
1108-1125. 
Casella, A., 2005. Storable votes. Games and Economic Behavior, 51, 391-419. 
Casella, A., Gelman, A. & Palfrey, T.R., 2006. An experimental study of storable 
votes. Games and Economic Behavior, 57, 123-154. 
Croson, R. & Konow, J., 2009. Social preferences and moral biases. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 69, 201-212. 
De Cremer, D., 2007. When the rich contribute more in public good dilemmas: The 
role of provision point level. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 536-
546. 
Diermeier, D. & Morton, R., 2003. Proportionality versus perfectness: Experiments 
in majoritarian bargaining. Unpublished manuscript. Chicago: Northwestern 
University. 
Dimdins, G. & Montgomery, H., 2005. Attitudes towards freedom and equality 
among Swedish and American students. In Tersman, F. ed. Democracy 
unbound? Basic explorations. Stockholm studies in democratic theory. 
Stockholm: Thales, 29-43. 
Fudge, R. & Quinn, C., 2001. On harwood's plural voting system. Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 32, 500-504. 
Gamliel, E. & Peer, E., 2006. Positive versus negative framing affects justice 
judgments. Social Justice Research, 19, 307-322. 
Gamliel, E. & Peer, E., 2010. Attribute framing affects the perceived fairness of 
health care allocation principles. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 11-20. 
Harwood, R., 1998. More votes for ph.D.'s. Journal of Social Philosophy, 29, 129-
141. 
Heyd, D. & Segal, U., 2006. Democratically elected aristocracies. Social Choice & 
Welfare, 27, 103-127. 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 5 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 9 
Girts Dimdins, Henry Montgomery, Erik Norell Egalitarian vs. proportional voting in various contexts 
Hortala-Vallve, R., 2007. Qualitative voting. University of Oxford Economics Series 
Working Papers, 320, 1-30. 
Konow, J., 2005. Blind spots: The effects of information and stakes on fairness bias 
and dispersion. Social Justice Research, 18, 349-390. 
Kuklinski, J.H. & Quirk, P.J., 2000. Reconsidering the rational public: Cognition, 
heuristics, and mass opinion. In Lupia, A., Mccubbins, M.D. & Popkin, S.L. eds. 
Elements of reason: Cognition, choice, and the bounds of rationality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 153-182. 
Petren, A., 2006. On proportionality as a democratic ideal in political decision-
making. In Tersman, F. ed. Democracy unbound: Basic explorations. 
Stockholm studies in democratic theory, vol. 2. Stockholm: Stockholms 
Universitet, Filosofiska Institutionen, 79-105. 
Sutter, M., 2002. Public bad prevention by majority voting on redistribution - 
experimental evidence. Group Decision and Negotiation, 11, 415-428. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D., 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of 
choice. Science, 211, 453-458. 
Tversky, A., Sattath, S. & Slovic, P., 1988. Contingent weighting in judgment and 
choice. Psychological Review, 95, 371-384. 
Zachariah, D., 2006. Democracy without politicians? Unpublished manuscript. 
Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology. 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 5 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 10 
Girts Dimdins, Henry Montgomery, Erik Norell Egalitarian vs. proportional voting in various contexts 
 
Appendix 1. Figures and Tables 
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Figure 1. The graph displays the results of the referendum of the ten issues using E10 as voting system. 
 
1. Introduce special taxes for car traffic going in and out of central Stockholm 
2. Building of a traffic route around central Stockholm (to reduce traffic in 
central Stockholm) 
3. Building of the so called Citybanan (a new railway track going beneath 
central Stockholm, increasing the capacity of train traffic by the double)   
4. Introduce a discount on collective transports in Stockholm for university 
students 
5. Transform publicly owned tenements to privately owned tenements in 
Stockholm 
6. Introduce written judgments of students from the first school year (as an 
alternative to grades. Today students get grades from their eighth school 
year in Sweden) in schools in Stockholm 
7. Give public financial support for building of small and inexpensive tenements 
in Stockholm  
8. Increase the number of surveillance cameras in public places in Stockholm  
9. Privatization of hospitals in the Stockholm area  
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10. Introduce a so called vårdnadsbidrag (a public subsidy for parents who 
choose to stay home and take care of their children instead of placing them 
in publicly owned day nurseries) in Stockholm 
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Figure 2. The graph displays the results of the referendum of the ten issues using P10 as voting system. 
 
1. Introduce special taxes for car traffic going in and out of central Stockholm 
2. Building of a traffic route around central Stockholm (to reduce traffic in 
central Stockholm) 
3. Building of the so called Citybanan (a new railway track going beneath 
central Stockholm, increasing the capacity of train traffic by the double)   
4. Introduce a discount on collective transports in Stockholm for university 
students 
5. Transform publicly owned tenements to privately owned tenements in 
Stockholm 
6. Introduce written judgments of students from the first school year (as an 
alternative to grades. Today students get grades from their eighth school 
year in Sweden) in schools in Stockholm 
7. Give public financial support for building of small and inexpensive tenements 
in Stockholm  
8. Increase the number of surveillance cameras in public places in Stockholm  
9. Privatization of hospitals in the Stockholm area  
10. Introduce a so called vårdnadsbidrag (a public subsidy for parents who 
choose to stay home and take care of their children instead of placing them 
in publicly owned day nurseries) in Stockholm 
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Figure 3. The graph displays the results of the referendum of the ten issues using P100 as voting system. 
 
1. Introduce special taxes for car traffic going in and out of central Stockholm 
2. Building of a traffic route around central Stockholm (to reduce traffic in 
central Stockholm) 
3. Building of the so called Citybanan (a new railway track going beneath 
central Stockholm, increasing the capacity of train traffic by the double)   
4. Introduce a discount on collective transports in Stockholm for university 
students 
5. Transform publicly owned tenements to privately owned tenements in 
Stockholm 
6. Introduce written judgments of students from the first school year (as an 
alternative to grades. Today students get grades from their eighth school 
year in Sweden) in schools in Stockholm 
7. Give public financial support for building of small and inexpensive tenements 
in Stockholm  
8. Increase the number of surveillance cameras in public places in Stockholm  
9. Privatization of hospitals in the Stockholm area  
10. Introduce a so called vårdnadsbidrag (a public subsidy for parents who 
choose to stay home and take care of their children instead of placing them 
in publicly owned day nurseries) in Stockholm 
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Table 1. Number of participants who chose to vote 
in each issue organized by system of voting. 
 
   
System of voting 
 
  E10 
 
P10 P100 
 
Question 1 
 
  
93% 
 
87% 
 
83% 
Question 2 
 
 80% 60% 57% 
Question 3 
 
 77% 60% 70% 
Question 4 
 
 93% 87% 87% 
Question 5 
 
 87% 70% 77% 
Question 6 
 
 97% 60% 67% 
Question 7 
 
 93% 80% 80% 
Question 8 
 
 93% 50% 67% 
Question 9 
 
 87% 77% 70% 
Question 10  93% 73% 70% 
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Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) for ratings of justice 
and satisfaction, in terms of system of voting 
   
System of voting 
 
Rating  E10 
 
P10 P100 
 
Justice 
 
  
6.87 (2.11) 
 
5.70 (2.54) 
 
5.97 (2.67) 
Satisfaction 
 
 6.83 (2.17) 5.90 (2.45) 6.07 (2.74) 
 
 
Table 3. Correlations between rating of importance and 
the number of votes, in terms of system of voting. 
   
System of voting 
 
  E10 
 
P10 P100 
 
Question 1 
 
  
.124 
 
.392* 
 
.489** 
Question 2 
 
 .237 .401* .472** 
Question 3 
 
 .500** .628** .534** 
Question 4 
 
 .129 .279 .238 
Question 5 
 
 -.048 -.043 .024 
Question 6 
 
 .166 .486** .280 
Question 7 
 
 -.184 .202 .036 
Question 8 
 
 -.131 .192 -.013 
Question 9 
 
 .119 .248 .324 
Question 10  .109 .580** .198 
 
 
 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
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Figure 4. Mean importance of the ten issues in the referendum (N = 30) 
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Figure 5. Mean evaluation of the five voting schemes in control, gain, and loss conditions 
(reversed ranks; higher number indicates more favorable evaluation) 
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Appendix 2. Scenarios used for Experiment 2 
Control condition 
Imagine that a new housing complex is about to be built in a city neighborhood. 
The law requires that the city residents have an opportunity to express their 
opinion about any new building projects. Several voting schemes have been 
proposed to ensure that those people most affected by the construction have their 
say on the matter. Below you will see a number of voting schemes, with various 
assignments of votes to different population groups. In each voting scheme, 
numbers in the cells correspond to the number of votes given to each voter in the 
respective group. Number „1“ means that each voter in the group has one vote on 
the issue. „0“ means that the respective group is not included in the vote on the 
issue, i.e. its members have no votes. „2“ means that each member of the 
respective group has two votes on the issue; „3“ means that each voter in the 
respective group has 3 votes. 
In light of your personal views of fairness, wisdom, and the greater good of society, 
please rank-order the following voting schemes starting from the most appropriate 
for this case to the least appropriate. 
 Scheme 
A 
Scheme 
B 
Scheme 
C 
Scheme 
D 
Scheme 
E 
Residents living in the 
block(s) adjacent to the 
construction site 
1 1 1 2 3 
Residents living in the 
administrative district where 
construction is planned, but 
not in adjacent blocks 
1 1 0 1 2 
Residents of all other city 
districts 1 0 0 0 1 
Rank:      
Loss condition 
Imagine that a new industrial park is about to be built in a city neighborhood. The 
construction will reduce the market value of apartments in that neighborhood 
significantly because of increased traffic, noise, and possible pollution. The law 
requires that the city residents have an opportunity to express their opinion about 
any new building projects. Several voting schemes have been proposed to ensure 
that those people most affected by the construction have their say on the matter. 
Below you will see a number of voting schemes, with various assignments of votes 
to different population groups. In each voting scheme, numbers in the cells 
correspond to the number of votes given to each voter in the respective group. 
Number „1“ means that each voter in the group has one vote on the issue. „0“ 
means that the respective group is not included in the vote on the issue, i.e. its 
members have no votes. „2“ means that each member of the respective group has 
two votes on the issue; „3“ means that each voter in the respective group has 3 
votes. 
In light of your personal views of fairness, wisdom, and the greater good of society, 
please rank-order the following voting schemes starting from the most appropriate 
for this case to the least appropriate. 
 
 
 Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E 
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A resident living in the block 
adjacent to the construction site 
whose apartment will depreciate by 
EUR 20.000 as a consequence of 
the construction 
1 1 1 2 3 
A resident living in the 
administrative district where 
construction is planned, whose 
apartment will depreciate by EUR 
2.000 as a consequence of the 
construction 
1 1 0 1 2 
A city resident whose apartment’s 
value will not change 1 0 0 0 1 
Rank:      
Gain condition 
Imagine that a new industrial park is about to be built in a city neighborhood. The 
construction will increase the market value of apartments in that neighborhood 
significantly because of improved infrastructure, increased interest of real estate 
dealers and influx of high-profile businesses. The law requires that the city 
residents have an opportunity to express their opinion about any new building 
projects. Several voting schemes have been proposed to ensure that those people 
most affected by the construction have their say on the matter. Below you will see 
a number of voting schemes, with various assignments of votes to different 
population groups. In each voting scheme, numbers in the cells correspond to the 
number of votes given to each voter in the respective group. Number „1“ means 
that each voter in the group has one vote on the issue. „0“ means that the 
respective group is not included in the vote on the issue, i.e. its members have no 
votes. „2“ means that each member of the respective group has two votes on the 
issue; „3“ means that each voter in the respective group has 3 votes. 
In light of your personal views of fairness, wisdom, and the greater good of society, 
please rank-order the following voting schemes starting from the most appropriate 
for this case to the least appropriate. 
 Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E 
A resident living in the block 
adjacent to the construction site 
whose apartment will appreciate by 
EUR 20.000 as a consequence of 
the construction 
1 1 1 2 3 
A resident living in the 
administrative district where 
construction is planned, whose 
apartment will appreciate by EUR 
2.000 as a consequence of the 
construction 
1 1 0 1 2 
A city resident whose apartment’s 
value will not change 1 0 0 0 1 
Rank:      
 
